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INCENTIVES TO SETTLE UNDER JOINT AND 
SEVERAL LIABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF SUPERFUND LITIGATION 
HOWARD F. CHANG and HILARY SIGMAN'' 
ABSTRACT 
Congress may soon restrict join t  and several l iabi l i ty for c leanup of contaminated 
sites under Superfund. We explore whether this change would discourage settle­
ments and is  therefore l ikely to increase the program ' s  already high litigation costs 
per site. Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and 
several l iab i l i ty may either encourage or discourage settlement, depending on the 
correl ation of outcomes at trial across defendants. We extend the ir  two-defendant 
model to a richer framework w ith N defendants. This extension allows us to test 
the theoretical model empirical ly using data on Superfund l i tigation. We find that 
joint  and several l iabil ity does not discourage settlements and may even encourage 
them. Our resul ts support the model's predictions about the effects of several vari­
ables, such as the degree of corre lation in trial outcomes .  
CouRTS have interpreted Superfund, formal ly the Comprehensive Envi­
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liab i l i ty Act (CERCLA), 1 to im­
pose j oint  and several l i ability on parties associated with contami nated sites .  
Joint and several l iabi lity allows the p laintiff to recover ful l  damages from 
any defendant in a multidefendant case, regardless of the defendant's share 
of liab i l ity for the damages. This liability rule  i s  controversial. All of the 
maj or proposals for congressional reauthorizat ion of Superfund would re­
strict jo int and several liabi lity.2 
* Professor of  law, Univers i ty of Pennsy lvania  Law School . and assistant professor of eco­
nomics, Rutgers Univers ity, respectively .  We thank Danie l  Kess ler, Danie l  Klerman, Lewis 
Kornhauser, A. Mi tchel l  Polinsky, W. K ip  V iscusi, an anonymous referee, and seminar par­
t ic ipants at the 1999 meetings of the A merican Law and Economics Assoc iat ion and of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute for helpfu l  comments. This re­
search was supported in part by grant R 82-2368 from the Office of Exp loratory Research of 
the U . S. Environmental Protect ion  Agency . 
I 42 U.S .C .  SS 960!-75 ( 1 994). 
2 M ark Reisch, Superfund Reauthorization Issues in the 105th Congress (Cong. Res. Serv. 
Rep. 1998) . 
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These changes to the l iability rules may reduce the incentives for defen­
dants to settle ,  increasing S uperfu nd ' s  already l arge transactions costs per 
site . In 1 985, the Reagan administration argued that Superfund's joint and 
several liabil ity would encourage defendants to settle .3 Early theoretical 
work on j oint  and several l iabil i ty supported this claim.4 However, recent  
research indicates that the effect of j oint and several l iabi l i ty on multidefen­
dant settlements depends on the degree to which outcomes at trial are corre­
lated across the defendants. Lewi s  Kornhauser and Richard Revesz present 
a formal model in which j oint  and several liabil i ty encourages settlements 
if trial outcomes are sufficiently correlated but discourages settlements if 
they are independent.5 They have also appl ied their theoretical analysis to 
joint and several l iability under S uperfund, seeking to inform the Superfund 
reauthorization debates.6 They conclude that theory alone cannot resolve the 
debates over the effects of j oint  and several l iabil ity. 
This  paper extends the Kornhauser-Revesz model to derive several 
hypotheses that we test us ing data on settlements between the Envi ronmen­
tal Protection Agency (EPA) and defendants under the Superfund. The em­
piri cal analysis considers both the choice of settlement over l itigation and 
the time between fil i ng of the case and settlement. By  examining these out­
comes, we seek to discover whether j oint  and several l iabi li ty under S u­
perfund tends to encourage or discourage settlement. The results shed l ight 
on the controversy over S uperfund's l iabi l i ty rules .  The analysis  also pro­
vides an empirical test of current theoretical models of part ies '  behavior 
under joint and several l iability. 
The empirical results do not support the view that joint and several l i abil­
i ty discourages settlement under Superfund. Indeed, the results are consis­
tent with a settlement-promoting effect from joint and several l iabil ity. I n  
3 See Superfund Reauthorization, Judicial and Legal Issues: Oversight Hearings before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov't Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1985) (statement of Lee Thomas, EPA administrator): id. at 45 (state­
ment of F. Henry Habicht II. assistant attorney general. Land and Natural Resources Divi­
sion): Superfund Improvement Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 5 1  before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18. 22 (1985) (statement of Lee Thomas. EPA adminis­
trator). 
4 See Frank H. Easterbrook, William M. Landes. & Richard A. Posner, Contribution 
among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis. 23 J. Law & Econ. 331 
(1980); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell. Contribution and Claim Reduction among 
Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis. 33 Stan. L. Rev. 44 7 (1981 ). 
5 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of 
Joint and Several Liability, 23 J. Legal Stud. 4 1  (1994): see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard 
L. Revesz. Settlements under Joint and Several Liability. 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 427 (1993). 
6 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz. Evaluating the Effects of Alternative Su­
perfund Liability Rules. in Analyzing Superfund: Economics. Science, and Law J I 5 (Richard 
L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eels. J 995). 
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addition, the results support m any of the predictions of the theory . For ex­
ample, we find that the l ike lihood of sett lement rather than l i tigation grows 
with the number of defendants . We also test the effects of two measures of 
the l i kely degree of correlation in tria l  outcomes among defendants. Defen­
dants appear to settle more frequent ly or more rapidly when thi s  corre lation 
i s  high, consistent with the theoretical predictions.  
The paper begins with a discussion of the previous theoretical l iterature 
on j oint and several l iabi li ty.  Section II presents our theoretical model of 
settlement under j oint and several l i abi l i ty .  Section III introduces the data 
that we use to test this model .  Section IV presents econometric estimates 
for two sets of equations .  One set of equations analyzes the determinants 
of settlement as opposed to l i ti gation.  A second set of equations analyzes 
t ime to settlement, using a hazard-rate model .  Section V concludes with im­
p lications for the Superfund debate. 
I. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Kornhauser and Revesz present a model of a s ingle plaintiff bringing suit 
against two defendants .  They assume complete information, so that each 
party has the same beliefs regarding the p l aintiff ' s  probabi l i ty of success at 
trial, the amount that would be awarded if the plaintiff prevai ls ,  and the 
l itigation costs of each party.  They consider the case in which each party i s  
risk neutral and infinitely solvent and l i tigation costs are zero . The p laintiff 
makes a settlement offer to each defendant. The defendants then decide si­
multaneously  and noncooperatively whether to accept these offers. The 
p laintiff then l i tigates against  any nonsettl ing defendants . 
Under nonjoint (several only)  l i abi l i ty ,  the p laintiff ' s  claim against each 
defendant is equal to that defendant's share of the total l i abi l i ty. In this 
case, the parties are indifferent  between l i tigation and settlement, whether 
the outcomes at trial are correlated across defendants or independent. Each 
party would be wil l i ng to sett le for the expected value of the outcome at 
trial i f  a l l  were to l it igate i nstead. 
Under joint and several l iab i l ity, if  the p laintiff prevai l s  against both de­
fendants, then the court apportions the damages between the defendants ac­
cording to their rel ative shares of the l iabi li ty.  Under an unconditiona l  pro 
tanto setoff rule, if only one defendant accepts the settlement offer, then the 
court reduces the p laintiff's claim against the nonsett l ing defendant by the 
amount of the settlement, without inquiring into whether the settl ing defen­
dant was l iable.7 Superfund, for example, imposes on responsible parties 
7 Daniel Klcrman, Settling Multi defendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional Setoff 
Rules, 25 J. Legal Stud. 445 (1996), shows that the tendency for joint and several liability 
to inhibit settlement depends on the assumption that the setoff is unconditional. 
208 THE JOU RNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
(generators and transporters of hazardous wastes and owners and certain 
prior owners of hazardous waste s i tes) joint and several l iabil i ty for the cost 
of cleaning up hazardous waste sites and applies an unconditional pro tanto 
rule in the event of partial  settlement. R 
If the outcome at trial for each defendant i s  independent,  then Korn­
hauser and Revesz show that joint and several l i abi l ity (with an uncondi­
tional pro tanto rule) discourages settlement. Under these circumstances the 
p laintiff wi l l  prefer l itigation over any settlement on terms acceptabl e  to one 
or both defendants . If  the outcomes at trial are instead perfectl y  correl ated, 
then joint and several l iabi lity encourages settlement.9 Thus, Kornhauser 
and Revesz show that the effect of joint and several l iabi li ty on settlement 
depends on the degree to which the outcomes at trial are correl ated across 
defendants. 10 If defendants can cooperate in settlement negotiations,  how­
ever, then the effects of joint and several l i abil i ty on settlement  disappear." 
We extend the Kornhauser-Revesz model to a richer framework with N 
defendants to see how the Kornhauser-Revesz resul ts genera l ize. W ith more 
than two defendants, i t  becomes possible for the outcome at trial for one 
defendant to be correlated with the outcomes for some defendants but not 
with the outcomes for other defendants . Our extension a l lows for this more 
complex pattern of correlations and enables us to generate predictions that 
we can test using data on Superfund settlements with l arge groups of defen­
dants. In particular, we generate comparat ive statics resu l ts regarding the 
effect of the number of defendants and the conelation among tria l  outcomes 
on the l ike l ihood of settl ement. We also extend the Kornhauser-Revesz 
model by devel oping an exp licit model of the l ikelihood of sett lement that 
includes a role  for not only l i tigation costs but also pessimism or optimism 
' See . .[2 U.S.C. �� 9607(a}. 9613(f}(2} ( 1 994} . 
. , Suppose the defendants would share liability equally if they both litigate and then lose 
at trial . Under these circumstances the plaintiff wi l l  strictly prefer settlement with both defen­
dants over litigation. Kornhauser and Revesz (Kornhauser & Revesz. Multidefendant Settle­
ments . . wpm note 5. at 68-70) derive more ambiguous results when the shares of the two 
defendants are unequal:  if these shares are sufficiently different. then the p lai ntiff wil l  prefer 
to settle with one defendant and litigate against the other. This result. however, seems to be 
an artifact of their assumptions regarding the bargaining game. For example. if the plaintiff 
can make settlement offers to the defendants in sequence rather than simultaneously, then 
the plaintiff would prefer settlement with both defendant:; over l itigation. 
111 Prior analysis of multidefendant settlements focused on the case of perfect con·elation. 
Sec Easterbrook. Landes. & Posner, supro note -L Polinsky & Shavell, supm note 4. 
11 See Kornhauser & Revesz. Multidefendant Settlements. supro note 5. at 57. Further­
mort::, John J. Donohue Ill. The Effect of Joint and Several Liability on the Settlement Rate­
Mathematical Symmetries and Metaissues about Rational Litigant Behavior: Comment on 
Kornhauser and Revesz. 23 J. Legal Stud. 54:1. 555-56 ( 1 994). shows that by making settle­
tw�nt offers that are contingent on acceptance by all defendants, a p laintiff could obtai n the 
sam•: outcome that perfect cooperation among the defendants \vould produce. 
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regarding the outcome at trial . These extensions prove to be important and 
produce some surprising results: the effect of some parameters on the l ikeli­
hood of settlement can depend on whether differences in litigation costs or 
in pessimism account for differences in settlement outcomes .  Our exten­
sions enable us to test whether joint and several l iability (with the uncondi­
tional pro tanto rule) has the expected effects on settlements and, if so, 
whether it on balance encourages or discourages settlements in the Su­
perfund context. 
II. THE MODEL 
Suppose that a single plaintiff brings suit against N defendants, where N 
is an integer and N > 1. Suppose that the defendants would share liability 
equally if they litigate and lose at trial . Normal ize the amount  of damages 
at stake to equal one, so that if the plaintiff were to prevail at tr ial against 
all N defendants, for example, each would pay 1 IN. Let p represent the 
probability that the p laintiff prevails against any given defendant, where 
0 < p < 1. If  the plaintiff and the defendants have different subjective esti­
mates of p, then let pi' represent the plaintiff ' s  estimate and p" represent the 
defendants' common estimate. 
The plaintiff makes a settlement offer to each of the defendants s imulta­
neously, who must either accept the offer and pay the proposed amount in  
a settlement or reject the offer. I f  some defendants reject the offer, then the 
plaintiff will litigate against the nonsettling defendants . 12 Litigation would 
impose costs on the parties: cl' on the plaintiff and c" on each defendant, 
where cP 2:: 0 and c" > 0. The defendants respond simultaneously and non­
cooperatively to the plaintiff's settlement offer. All parties are risk neutral 
and seek to maximize their expected payoff.u 
Suppose the N defendants are divided into n groups, where n i s  an integer 
and 1 ::; n < N. The n groups may be of unequal size . Within each group 
the outcomes at trial are perfectly correlated across defendants. Among the 
n groups, however, the outcomes at trial are independent. Thus, n is a pa­
rameter that indicates the degree to which the outcomes at trial are inde­
pendent among the defendants: if n = 1, then the outcomes are perfectly 
correlated among all defendants, but if n = N. then the outcomes are inde-
12 Like Kornhauser & Revesz. M u l t iclefendant Sett lements, supm note 5,  at 58 n .45. we 
assu me that the p laint iff can commit i tse lf  to l i t igate against nonset t l ing defendants. This 
assumption seems especia l ly  reasonable i n  the Superfund context, in  wh ich the plaint iff ( the 
EPA) is an extreme example of a repeat p l ayer that has much to gain by bu i ld ing a reputation 
for l i t igating against nonsett l ing defendants. 
11 Risk aversion wou ld only encourage settlements and i ntroduce another reason for join t  
and several l i abi l i ty t o  promote settlement. 
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pendent among all defendan ts .  In between these polar cases are cases with 
some mix of correlation and independence. 
A. The Settlement Range 
Let sP represent the plaintiff's expected payoff from litigating  against all 
N defendants .  Under j oint  and several liability, the plaintiff only needs to 
succeed against one defendant to recover i n  ful l .  Therefore, the plaintiff w ill 
receive an amount equal to one unless it fails against  each group of defen­
dants .  Against each group, the probabi li ty of failure is 1 - p. Therefore, 
s, = 1 - (1 - pp)" - Cp. ( 1 ) 
Recall that as n ranges from 1 to N, we move from the case of perfectly 
correlated trial outcomes among all defendants to the case of i ndependent 
outcomes for all defendants . Thi s  decrease i n  correlation among trial out­
comes makes lit igation against  all defendants more attractive for the plain­
tiff, because i t  decreases the probabi lity that the plaintiff fails against  all 
defendants . This effect increases the plaintiff's expected payoff sP from 
trial . For the plaintiff to be willing to make a settlement offer of sf N to each 
defendant, 
(2) 
is a necessary condition; otherwise, the plaintiff would prefer l i t igation 
against all defendants over such a settlement. 
Consider a defendant's decis ion whether to accept such a settlement offer 
or to litigate i nstead. It would be a Nash equilibrium for each defendant to 
accept the offer if each defendant expects l itigating against  the plaintiff 
alone (after all other defendants have accepted the offer) to yield a lower 
payoff than paying siN to the plaintiff in a settlement. The defendant would 
calculate the expected payoff from reject ing an offer s/ N when all other 
defendants have accepted this  offer, taking into account the setoff that a 
court would apply under the unconditional pro tanto rule as a result of the 
N - 1 other defendants settling for s/ N per defendant. A court would hold 
a losing defendant l iable for max[O, J - (N- l)s/N]. Assume that a court 
would not allow a suit for zero damages to go forward, so that defendants 
would have no incentive to accept a settlement offer if s > N/(N - 1). 
Thus, 
N 
s < ---
N-
(3) 
is a necessary condition for the offer to be acceptable. Assuming that the 
plaintiff makes an offer consistent with inequal ity (3), a defendant rej ecting 
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such a n  offer and choosing instead t o  litigate alone would face a probability 
of Pd of being held liable for 1 - (N- l)s/N in damages. For each defen­
dant to settle for the amount sl N, 
£ ,o; p{ 1 - (N - 1 )  �] + c, (4) 
is a necessary condition. Note that n does not affect the defendant's deci­
sion, as the defendant considers the prospect of litigating alone, when there 
would be no other defendants that might lose at trial and share l iability. 
Solving inequality ( 4) for s, we can restate this necessary condition as 
(5 )  
where 
(6) 
As N increases, the prospect of litigating alone becomes less attractive for 
a defendant contemplating a settlement offer. A larger N implies that each 
defendant would pay a smaller fraction 1 IN of a settlement, but if it litigates 
instead, then it faces the prospect of losing at a trial in which it could be 
held liable for the whole amount of damages (minus a setoff for the settle­
ment with the other defendants). Therefore, as N grows large, l itigation be­
comes less attractive to each defendant compared to a settlement for any 
given total amount, and the plaintiff can therefore extract a larger total 
amount s11 in a settlement with all N defendants . Assume that if it is a Nash 
equilibrium for all defendants to accept such an offer, then all defendants 
will accept this offer.14 
Given that s" < N/(N- 1), there will always be an s that satisfies neces­
sary conditions (2) and (3). Putting necessary conditions (2), (3), and (5)  
together, therefore, we can state that such a settlement is  possible only if 
there exists an s that satisfies 
(7) 
14 L i ke Marcel Kahan, The Incentive Effects o f  Sculcments under Joint and Several L iab i l­
ity. 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 389, 391 (1996). we focus on this Nash equil ibrium i n  order 
to emphasize the aspects of the model that are most re levant for our purposes. K ornhauser 
and Revcsz (Kornhauser & Revesz, Mul t iclefendant Settlements. suprct note 5. at 63-65) ex­
amine other N ash equi li bria and show bow the p la intiff would avoid equ i l ibria with l i t igation 
by making appropriate asymmetric offers. 
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We can express our necessary condition as follows: 
(8) 
Let S denote the size of the "settlement range," such that 
(9) 
We can now show the following: 
PROPOSITION 1 .  If S > 0, then the p laintiff will not l i tigate against all 
defendants. If S < 0, then the plaintiff will not settle with all defendants . 
Proof See Appendix .  
Remark. A positive settlement range i s  sufficient to  ensure that the 
plaintiff would rather settle with all defendants than l i tigate against all de­
fendants . A negative settlement range i s  sufficient to ensure that the plain­
tiff would ratber litigate against all defendants tban settle on any terms tbat 
are acceptable to all defendants. These possible terms include unequal set­
tlement shares for the defendants .  Tbat is, if the parties would not all agree 
to any settlement based on equal sbares for tbe defendants, then tbey would 
not all agree on any other settlement either. In this  sense, S represents a 
general indicator of the likelihood of settlement among the part ies .  
B. Comparative Statics 
We can also derive some general comparative statics results. Tn order to 
focus on cases in which tbe likelihood of settlement might change in re­
sponse to changes in any of the parameters, assume that l itigation costs are 
not so large as to make settlement a certainty . S pecifically, assume 
( 1 0) 
so that the plaintiff has a posit ive expected payoff from litigation against 
all the defendants: s" > 0. Otherwise, the plaintiff would always prefer a 
settlement for zero over litigation  against  all defendants. Also assume 
( 1 1 )  
Otherwise, s" > 1, and the defendants would always be willi ng to pay the 
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full amount at stake in  a settlement rather than lit igate. We can now show 
the following: 
PROPOSITION 2. The settlement range S is strictly increasing in cJ, cP, 
p", and N, and strictly decreasing in pP and n. 
Proof See Appendix .  
Remark. Higher litigation costs (higher c" and cp) and more pessimistic 
expectations regarding trial outcomes (higher PJ and lower pp) both promote 
settlement by making litigation less attractive compared to a settlement. 
These comparative static results are familiar from the case of nonj oint  l ia­
bility: that is ,  one would expect to find these effects even if the N defen­
dants were each separately l iable for 11 N of the total amount at stake. The 
effect of n on the settlement range, however, is unique to a regi me of j oint  
and several liabi l i ty.  Under a regime of nonjoint l iability, the degree of cor­
relation between trial outcomes among the defendants would not affect the 
settlement range. 
As explained earlier, under joint and several l iability, an increase i n  n 
produces an increase in sP, the plaintiff ' s  payoff from l itigating against all 
defendants. This effect makes the plaintiff more demanding, which in turn 
makes settlement less l ikely. It becomes more likely that ei ther the defen­
dants or the plaintiff must be more pessimistic, or l it igation costs must be 
h igher, in order to make a settlement with all defendants possible .  The ef­
fect  of n > 1 represents the potential settlement- inhibiting effect of j oint 
and several l iabil ity.  
The effect of N on settlement includes an effect that i s  unique to joint 
and several liability. Under nonjoint liabili ty , one woul d  expect a large N 
to promote settlement in the fol lowing sense: if each defendant is l iable for 
only J IN of the total damages at stake, then as N grows large the amount 
at stake for each defendant grows small compared to its litigation costs c". 
As c" looms larger compared to the stakes for each defendant, thi s  effect 
tends to promote settlement even if liabil ity i s  nonj oint instead of j oi nt and 
several. If, however, we hold constant the ratio between l itigation costs and 
the amount at stake per defendant, for example, if c" = 0, then N would 
have no effect on the settlement range under nonjoint l iability. 
Under joint and several l iab ility, however, N has a unique effect, which 
tends to promote settlement even if we hold constant the ratio between 
lit igation costs and the amount at stake per defendant (for example,  if c" = 
0) . As explained earlier, an increase i n  N produces an increase in  s", and 
this effect is present even if c" = 0. This effect makes defendants will ing 
to pay more in a settlement, which makes settlement more l ikely.  It  be­
comes more l ikely that either the defendants or the plaintiff must be more 
optimistic to make a settlement with all defendants impossible. This effect 
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similarly, p�' represents the plai ntiff ' s  belief that is necessary to prevent set­
tlement among all the parties in spite of joint and several l iability and the 
unconditional pro tanto rule .  From either perspective, the degree of opti­
mism required to prevent settlement (and thus the probabil i ty of settlement) 
increases in N. 
PROPOSITION 6 .  I f  cP = cd = 0, but we constrain n such that n = N, then 
a) if Pd = pP = p and N > 1, then S < 0 and the plaintiff will not settle 
with all defendants; 
b) if p11 = pP = p and we consi der S as a function of N, we find that S (N) 
i s  not monotonic: S(N) falls from S(l) = 0 and remains negative as long 
as N > 1 but reaches a unique local minimum and then rises  back toward 
zero as N approaches infini ty ; 
c) if we consider p;j' as a function of N, we find that p,j(N) rises mono­
tonically from p;/ (1) = Pr toward one as N approaches infinity; 
d) if we consider p;/ as a function of N, we find that p;;" (N) falls mono­
tonically from p;J' ( 1)= Pc� toward zero as N approaches infin ity. 
Proof See Appendix. 
Remork. If outcomes at trial are independent among all N defendants, 
then joint and several liabi l i ty (with the pro tanto rule) inhibits settlement 
by reducing the settlement  range. As N goes from one to N > 1,  the settle­
ment range goes from zero to negative.  If N > 1, then to achieve a settle­
ment among all parties, litigation costs must be positive (cl' > 0 or c11 > 0) 
or the parties must be relatively pessimistic about their prospects at trial 
(p,, < p"). 
The settlement range remains negative as long as N > l, but i t  rises to­
ward zero as N grows large. As long as n > 1, joint and several liability 
has a settlement-inhibiting effect as well as a settlement-promoting effect. 
The effect from ll, which we have assumed equals N, on the plaintiff's min­
imum settlement demands" dominates the effect from N on the defendant's 
maximum settlement s".16 
Although S suggests that N has a nonmonotonic effect on the l ikelihood 
of settlement, p;)' and p;;' suggest that N has a monotonic effect .  As N grows 
larger, the parties must be more pessimistic to make a settlement among all 
parties possible .  For example, p;/ represents the bel ief among defendants 
that is necessary to make settlement among all the parti es possible in spite 
of joint and several l iab ility and the unconditional pro tanto rule; similarly,  
p;;' represents the plaintiff ' s  belief that is  necessary to make settlement 
among all the parties possible in spite of joint and several I iability and the 
16 As N grows larger, both s" and s.� approach one. and the gap between them must fall .  
The rate o f  increase i n  each var iable s lows and approaches zero. but the rate of  i ncrease i n  
s1, f::ll s below the rate of  increase i n  sd, which causes S t o  become less negative .  
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unconditional pro tanto rule. From either perspective, the degree o f  pessi­
mism required to make settlement possible increases in  N. Thus, one would 
expect the probability of settlement to fall as N grows large. 
The contrast between the shape of the pJ' (N) and Pi1(N) functions on the 
one hand and the S(N) function on the other hand suggests that a focus on 
the settlement range alone as an indicator of the likelihood of settlement 
can be misleading. These results indicate that our hypotheses regarding the 
effect on settlement rates may depend on our underlying model of what 
leads parties to settle in  spite of the effects of j oi nt and several liability and 
the unconditional pro tanto rule. Our reliance on p;j and Pt assumes that 
pessimism regarding outcomes at trial accounts for settlements under these 
circumstances. We might, however, look at litigation costs as another possi­
ble explanation for settlements in  these cases. 
The more negative S becomes, the larger litigation costs must be to make 
a settlement among all parties possible. Recall that cJ and c;; represent al­
ternative measures of the litigation costs necessary to induce settlement in  
spite of  joint and several liability and  the unconditional pro tanto rule. We 
can solve for d and cJ' as  functions of N and take d (N) and c} (N) to  be  
another way to  measure the i nhibiting effect of jo int and several l iab ility 
(with the unconditional pro tanto rule) on settlement. We can show that nei­
ther d (N ) nor c;; (N) is monotonic. 
PROPOSITION 7. If p.� = p" = p and we constrain n such that 11 = N, 
then 
a) if  cl' = 0 and we consider c;j as a function of N , we find that d (N ) 
rises from c;;'( 1) = 0 and remains positive as long as N > 1 ,  then reaches 
a unique l ocal maximum, and then falls back toward zero as N approaches 
infini ty; 
b) if c" = 0 and we consider c;; as a function of N , we find that c} (N) 
rises from c}(l) = 0 and remains positive as long as N > 1,  then reaches 
a unique local maximum, and then falls back toward zero as N approaches 
infinity. 
Proof See Appendix. 
Remark. For N = 1 ,  joint and several liability will have no effect on 
sett lement incentives, and thus c:/ = c;;' = 0. For N > 1 ,  that l i ability re­
gime tends to inhibit settlement, and thus c:i' > 0 and c;; > 0. As N grows 
large, however, d and cj!' both decrease in N and approach zero asymptoti­
cally .  
Suppose litigation costs (a s  a fraction of  the total amount a t  stake in a 
case ) differ from case to case and are distributed over an i nterval from zero 
to some value greater than the m axima of d and c;/, so that some cases 
settle and others do not. If cases fail to settle because of the effects of j oint 
and several liability and the unconditional pro tanto rule, and we assume 
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that the distribution of litigation costs is constant as N grows large, then we 
would expect the settlement rate to be inversely related to c;;- and cf 
On the other hand, if beliefs about prospects for success at trial differ 
from case to case, and this variation accounts for which cases settle, then 
we would expect the sett lement rate to be related to p:f and p;' ,  which 
would imply that the settlement rate would be a monotonic function of N. 
Thus, whether N has a monotonic effect on the settlement rate would de­
pend on what type of heterogeneity predominates in the sample of cases 
that we observe. 
III. THE DATA 
To explore these relationships e mpirically,  we study federal civil  suits for 
cleanup of sites under CERCLA. Defendants in  these c ases may include 
past and present site owners as well as waste generators and transporters 
who contributed waste to the site. The EPA refers to these parties as Poten­
tially Responsible Parties (PRPs) .  
A. EPA Civil Docket Dnta 
Our basic data source on these disputes is the EPA' s civil docket, which 
contains records of civi l  refenals by the EPA to the Department of Justice 
through March 1 997 .  For each case referred, the data provide a l ist of de­
fendants, fi l ing and conclusion dates, and the outcome of the case. Some 
cases have data on the value of settlements or costs recovered in court but 
these data are missing too often for use in our analyses . The docket reports 
only one outcome for each case; if some defendants sett le  in a di spute and 
others l i tigate , then the dispute splits into two "cases ."  B ecause of this en­
dogeneity in the definit ion of a case, Table 1 and the later e mpirical analy­
ses focus on defendants rather than cases as the level of observation. 
We selected defendants in cases pertaining to nonfederal faci lity s i tes on 
the National Priorities L ist (NPL ) .  Superfund l iability appl ies to other con­
taminated sites in addition to those on the NPL; however, only NPL sites 
have the ful l  range of explanatory data and thus are inc luded in our analy­
ses. We excluded federal fac i l ity NPL si tes because procedures differ at 
these sites from most NPL sites .  The docket con tains 8,732 defendants in  
734 c ivi l cases pertaining to  nonfederal facility NPL sites. 
In addition, the analysis i s  l i mited to NPL s ites without de minimis  PRPs. 
In 1 986, Congress required the EPA to develop special settlement proce­
dures for de minimis PRPs, often generators or transporters who contributed 
very smal l waste volumes . 1 7 These PRPs may sati sfy their l i ab i l ity by pay-
1 7  See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz , De M i ni m i s  Sett lements u nder S u­
perfund: ;\n Empirical Study.  in Revesz & S tewart eds . . supra note 6. at 1 87. 
I 
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TABLE I 
DESCRIPTIVE ST A TIST!CS BY DEFENDANT 
OUTCOME 
In 
Settled Litigated progress Other 
Number of defendants 766 2 2  286 59 
Means (and Standard Deviations )  
Case duration (years) 2 . 17 2 .76 5 .79 1.68 
(2 6 1 )  ( 2  66) (4 .23) { 1 .59) 
Site characteristics: 
Sole PRP .06 . 1 4 .02 .05 
Number of PRPs 1 7.42 7.77 1 8 .9 1 14.4 1 
( 1 4 .77) ( 4.62) ( 1 5 .43) ( I  0.8 1 l 
Off-site contributors .60 . 18 . 76 ' �  , _) _) 
Contamination after 1980 .47 .91 .48 . 5 3  
Cleanup cost ($ millions 1997 ) 23 .2 1 26.84 28.32 2 7 . 1 0  
( 1 6. 1 2 ) ( 1 7 . 1 3 )  ( 18.88) ( 1 6  75 ) 
Cost per PRP ( $  millions 1997 ) 4. 2 1  6.08 2 .80 4.67 
( 8. 1  0 )  (9.68) (4.03 )  (6. 37 ) 
Defendant characteristics: 
Fim1 .78 .82 .77 .71 
Number of other sites 9.20 .95 8.04 7 . 1 9  
( 18. 1 7) (2 .0 1 )  ( 16.69) ( 1 3 . 65 ) 
NoTE. -For conti n uous vari ables .  standard deviations are in parentheses. Other o u tcom�s: 2 1  cases 
combined with another. 19 dis missed by court.  SC\'t:n voluntar i l y  dismissed. and 12 unkno w n .  
ing a small share of c leanup costs. Because a special procedure app lie::; to 
these sett l ements , we wish  to exclude them from the analysis .  A handful of 
cases in the docket data refer to CERCLA Section 122(g) ,  1' which all [bo­
rizes de minimis sett lements .  However, not all the data conta in  detailed 
statutory references, so many cases that involve de min imis PRPs do not 
refer to CERCLA Section  J 22(g) .  Thus, to be sure we exclude a l l  de min i­
mis  PRPs, the analysi s  includes only cases at s i tes w ith no de min imis  
PRPs . 1 Y A total of  1 , 1 38 defendants in 332 cases remain following the:-;� 
exclusions.  
Table I shows the results of cases for the defendants that are the ba� i s  
I K  4 2  U S.C. § 9622(g ) ( J 994) . 
1 0  The EPA· s 1 993 Survey of Remedial Program Managers (RPMs) cont�! ins information 
on the numbers of cle minimis PRPs at each s i te .  We used these data to exclude obscrv�1 t ions .  
This exclusion reducccl the sample by 6.973 defendants and 2.39 cases. In addi t ion.  the sam· 
ple excludes s i tes with more than 100 PRPs because it seems likely that such s i tes include 
some de minimis PRPs. This further excl usion reduced the sample by seven cases and 621 
defendants. 
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of the analysis. The total number of defendants in the table is 1, 133 ,  after 
dropping five defendants for which the explanatory variables were i ncom­
plete. Of 847 defendants for which the d ispute had reached a resolution, 
766 (or 90.4 percent) had settled with the agency, and only 22 defendants 
(under 2 .6  percent) had l i tigated to j udgment. This trial rate is somewhat 
lower than the rate that Theodore Eisenberg and Henry Farber report for all 
federal civil litigation.20 The remaining 59 defendants had other outcomes, 
including cases dismissed by the court, cases dropped by the government, 
and cases recorded as result ' ' unknown. ' '  The empirical analyses in the 
next section drop these 59 defendants. Finally, for 286 defendants the case 
was still in progress as of March 1 997. As the table reports,  these cases had 
been in progress for an average of 5 . 8  years, compared to 2.2 years for set­
tled cases and 2. 8 years for lit igated cases.  
B. Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory variables derive from a few data sets that we merged with 
the docket data. As a measure of N, we collected data on the number of 
PRPs at the site. The S ite Enforcement Tracking System (SETS) provided 
names and address of PRPs who were sent notice letters. The SETS, unfor­
tunately, was incomplete (although the omissions did not seem to be sys­
tematic ) ,  so we supplemented these PRP l ists with the l i st of defendants at 
any case pertaining to the site . 2 1  To represent N, we use the total count of 
PRPs, rather than the count of defendants, because the total PRP count rep­
resents all potentially liable parties. If the EPA prevai l s  against  a first group 
of PRPs, other PRPs may never appear as defendants, but we would st i l l  
wish to include them in  N. 
As reported in Table 1 ,  defendants who settle are at s i tes that average 
about  1 7  PRPs, compared to only eight PRPs for defendants who l itigate . 
A significant number of both settling and l itigating defendants are sole 
PRPs, but this status is more common for l i ti gating defendants. Thus ,  the 
mble suggests that defendants at multiple PRP sites might  settle preferen­
tial ly .  However, the two groups of defendants differ in other ways too, so 
a multiple regression i s  necessary to confirm thi s  difference. 
The degree of correlation in the outcome at trial ,  measured i n  the model 
by the number of groups of defendants, n,  is more difficult to observe . We 
use chC!racteris tics that may allow PRPs to pursue different defense strate-
'·' '  � ee Theodore Ei senberg & Henry S. Farber, The L i ti gious Pla int iff Hypothesis :  Case 
Sekcrion and Resolution. 28 RAND J. Econ. S92, S I 02 ( 1 997 ). 
� 1  \Ve have tried to defme defendants as parent companies. counting only one defendant 
when mu! t ir !e  subs idiaries are named as defendants :1t  a s i te .  
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gies as our measures of r z .  One measure is whether PRPs include off-site 
waste generators and transporters in  addition to past and present owners of 
the site. Off-s ite PRPs may have an easier time offering defenses that deny 
involvement at the sites than do on-site PRPs. S ite owners, on the other 
hand, may i nvoke an ' ' innocen t l andowner' ' defense that would not be 
avai lable to waste generators or transportersY Uncertainty over a court ' s  
receptivity to  each of  these legal defenses may i mply some COITelation in  
trial outcomes among PRPs invoking the same type of  defense and less  cor­
relation in trial outcomes among PRPs offering different defenses . Thus ,  the 
presence of both kinds of PRPs at the site may reduce con-elation in out­
comes at trial. 
Data on whether sites have off-site contributors among their PRPs derive 
from a 1 993 survey of Remedial Program Managers (RPMs) ,  the officials 
in  charge of overseeing s i te c leanup at each NPL siteY As Table  1 reports,  
60 petcent of settling defendants are at sites with off-site contributors, com­
pared to only 1 8  percent of lit igating defendants . Although thi s  comparison 
would suggest that greater differentiation among defendants encourages set­
tlement, counter to our theoretical predictions, the presence of off-site PRPs 
i s  strongly rel ated to the number of PRPs .  Thus, the apparent association 
may only be the result of this correlation.  
A second measure of n i s  whether some contamination occuned after 
1 980.  V irtual ly  al l sites had some contamination prior to 1 980, the year that 
Superfund passed, but only some sites had additional contamination after 
1 980. If  the same PRPs contributed to both the early and late contamina­
tion, whether the site has contamination in both periods will not affect the 
con-elation of outcomes at tria l .  If contamination at different times is the 
contribution of different defendants, however, the difference in t iming 
across defendants may cause them to offer different defenses. B ecause the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)2� i nstituted ' ' cradle to 
grave" tracking of hazardous waste in the late 1 970s, the sources of con­
tamination are probably better documented in  the later period than in  the 
early period. The PRPs associated with later contamination may therefore 
mount different defenses than other PRPs .  Thus, at some sites,  contamina­
tion in  the later period may lower corre lation in  outcomes at trial .  In the 
table, l itigating defendants are more l ikely to come from sites with recent 
contamination,  which is consi stent with this interpretation. 
In  addition to the variables N and n, the model suggests that the amount 
at stake may influence the l ikel ihood of settlement .  Litigation costs, c" and 
�� See 42 US.C. § 960 1 (35 ) (B)  ( ! 994). 
2' See U.S .  Environmental Protection Agency, Users· Gu ide to the RPM S i te Data ( 1 995 ) .  
2 4  -12 u.sc.  § §  690 ! -6992k ( 1 994) .  
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c1, enter the equations normalized by the amount at stake. As a result, this 
amount should affect cd and cP and thus enter the estimated equations, un­
less absolute lit igation costs vary exactly proportionately with the amount 
at stake. If l it igation costs rise less than proportionately with the amount at 
stake (as seems l ikely) ,  then an increase in this  amount would have the op­
posite effect of an increase in l itigation costs and thus tend to decrease set­
tlement .  
Previous empirical studies of  settlement have found that stakes are an 
important predictor of  settlement frequencies i n  s ingle-defendant contexts . 
Kip Viscusi ,  for example, fi nds that high stakes discourage settlement of 
product l iabil i ty claims, which is consistent with our expectationsY Jeffrey 
Perloff and Daniel Rubinfeld, however, find the reverse effect i n  antitrust 
cases . 26 They attribute this effect to risk aversion, which creates an i nsur­
ance value from settling high-stakes cases .  Although risk aversion is absent 
from our formal model, this prior research suggests it may play a role in 
the empirical results .  
In addition to the total amount at stake, we also include the amount at 
stake per PRP. In the absence of this variable, N might have settlement­
promoting effects even under nonj oint l iabi li ty. Assuming (as i n  our model) 
that PRPs have equal liabil i ty shares, each defendant' s  l iabil ity would de­
cl ine with N as the total stakes are split among all defendants. B ecause the 
stakes per defendant would fall relative to the l itigation costs, settlement 
would rise with N. Thus, the equations include the stakes per defendant to 
isolate the effects of N that flow uniquely from joint and several l iability. 
To measure the stakes in  the disputes we study, we use the anticipated 
present value of cleanup costs at the site. Total site cleanup costs may over­
state the true stakes in these disputes .  The EPA sometimes divides cleanup 
projects by environmental media and area w ithin the site and sues sepa­
rately for these different proj ects .  However, the EPA does not provide in­
formation on the amount i t  seeks from specific groups of defendants . In­
deed, the set of cleanup proj ects covered in a case may be a subject of 
negotiation .  Thus, overall site costs are our best avai lable proxy for the 
amount at stake. 
The RPM survey provides data on expected total cleanup costs for most 
s i tes .  However, the RPMs often failed to respond to these questions .  For 
these sites ,  we used remedy costs i n  all Records of Decision (RODs) signed 
cj See W.  Kip Viscusi ,  Determinants of the Disposit ion of Product  L i ab i l i ty Cla ims and 
Compensat ion for Bodi ly I nj ury. 1 5  J.  Legal Stud.  32 1 ( 1 986).  
2 6  See Jeffrey M. Pcrloff & Danie l  L.  Rubinfeld,  Sett lements in  Private Ant i trust L i ti ga­
t ion.  in  Private Ant i trust Lit i gation 1 49 (Lawrence J .  White eel. 1 988) .  
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for the s ite through the end of fi scal year 1 993Y Table reports that the 
present value of c leanup costs at the s ites exceeds $20 million ( in 1 997 dol­
lars ) .  Although lit igating defendants appear to be associated with more 
costly sites than do settling defendants, the difference is not statistically s ig­
nificant. 
Finally, we would l ike measures of l i tigation costs, c" and c, . Because 
the plaintiff i s  the same i n  al l  cases, measures of variation in  the plaintiff ' s  
costs, c1, are not obvious. However, heterogeneity across defendants may 
correlate with c". vVe employ two defendant characteristics that we can de­
rive from the l i st of names provided in  the docket. First, we coded defen­
dants as firms and other types of defendants . Nonfirm defendants i nc lude 
i ndividuals and their estates ,  local governments, federal agencies, and non­
profit organizations, particularly universities.  Firms may have systemati­
cally higher or lower l i ti gation costs because they are the least l i kely to in­
dulge tastes for or against legal disputes . 28 As Table 1 reports, 78 percent 
of settl ing defendants are firms .  
A second defendant characteristic that may affect defendants ' l it igation 
costs is the number of other sites at which this defendant is also a PRP. 
There are several possible effects of this variable .  On the one hand, the vari­
able may discourage settlement for two reasons . Defendants that are PRPs 
at multip le sites may develop more legal expertise, tending to decrease their 
l itigation costs . In addition, these defendants may have the incentive to es­
tablish reputations as hard bargainers , which reduces their aversion to l i tiga­
tion and thus also discourages sett lement. On the other hand, this variable 
may promote settlement. Those PRPs with various sites may face higher 
public relations costs from appearing to thwart site cleanup. Thus, the de­
fendant' s l i tigation costs, Crt, may be higher at these sites. Furthermore, de­
fendants with experience in the process may better evaluate their chances 
of success at trial ,  making it less l ikely that their fal se optimism wi l l  deter 
settlement. 
Many PRPs have multiple exposures to Superfund : settl ing defendants 
averaged nine other si tes in addition to the one in question. Most PRPs have 
only one site, but those with mult ip le sites tend to have dozens of sites. 
Defendants who litigated averaged fewer than one other site, much l ower 
27 A sma l l  number of s i tes had no cost data from e i ther source. For these s i tes we predic tt:ci 
costs based on a regression of cost on many site descriptive characteristics, includ i n g  Hazard 
Ranking System score, s i te acreage, contaminants .  contaminated media, type of fac i l i ty ,  and 
density of  the l ocal popu lat ion.  
2x  Eisenberg and Farber ( Eisenberg & Farber, supm note 20) argue that market d i sc ipl i ne 
w i l l  force fi rms to i ndulge both pos it ive and negative tastes less Creely than other l i t igants.  
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than the average for the whole data set. Thus, the settlement-promoting ef­
fects of exposure at multiple sites may dominate. 
I V .  ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES 
This section presents two sets of estimated equations designed to explore 
the empirical implications of the theoretical model .  The first set of equa­
tions studies whether cases are settled or l i tigated. The second set of equa­
tions analyzes the time until settlement .  
A. Settlement versus Litigation 
Following proposition 1 ,  we would expect to observe settlement when 
the unobserved settlement range, S, is positive and to observe l itigation oth­
erwise. To implement the model empirically, therefore, we estimate a bi­
nary choice model, i n  which observing settlement depends on  the variables 
that determine the sign of S. We assume, conventional ly, that the unob­
served heterogeneity has a normal distribution . Thus, the estimated model 
has the form 
pr(Settle = 1 )  = ¢(f(N,n,c",cP)) ,  ( 1 2) 
where N is the number of PRPs, n reflects the correlation i n  trial outcomes, 
cd represents the variables that may affect defendants ' litigation costs,  such 
as amount at stake and defendant characteristics, and cP may also appear 
through the effects of amount at stake. 
As discussed above, the defendant is the level of observation . Several 
defendant-level characteri stics are among the variables of interest. How­
ever, correlation in the unobserved heterogeneity across defendants at the 
same site seems likely. This conelation may tend to bias down the standard 
errors of explanatory variables that vary only at the site level .  To address  
this problem, we  report probit estimates with standard errors corrected for 
this clustering.2'J 
Table 2 presents the probit estimates .  The first column of the table com­
pares settlement frequencies for defendants at multiple PRP sites with those 
at single PRP sites .  The estimated coefficient is  positive but not s tatis tically 
different  from zero . The positive point estimate is consistent with the hy­
pothesis that jo int  and several liability on balance encourages settlement, as 
2Y Using Monte Carlo analysis ,  David Gui lkey and James Murphy find that th is  estimator 
performs we l l  in  samples s imi l ar in  size to our database ( sec David K .  Gu i lkey & James L. 
M urphy , Estimation and Testing i n  the Random Effects Probi t  ModeL 5 9  J .  Econometrics 
30 1 ( 1 99 3 ) ) .  It compares favorably with random effects estimators. which often fai led to con­
verge for our models. 
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TABLE 2 
D ETERMINANTS OF S ETTLEM ENT:  PROBIT ESTIMATES 
D E PE N DENT VARIAB L E :  
1 I f  SETTLE, 0 I f  LTTIGATE 
( 1 )  ( 2 ) ( 3 ) (4)  
S ite characteristics: 
Multiple PRPs (dummy) . 85 7  
( .632) 
Number of PRPs .053 - . 1 34 .045 
( .0 1 6 ) ( . 1 39) ( .024) 
Number of PRPs squared .764 
(divided by 1 00) ( .5 7 1 )  
Off-s i te contributors . 1 65 
( . 352 )  
Contami n ation after 1 980 - .77 1 
( .275)  
Cleanup cost - .008 - .0 1 1 - .006 - .007 
(.0 I 0) ( .0 1 0) (.0 I I ) (.0 1 0 ) 
Cost per PRP . 0 1 0  .020 - .004 .0 1 3  
( .02 1 )  ( .024) { .025 ) ( .022) 
Defendant characteristics: 
F irm - .298 - .340 - .384 - .267 
( . 225 ) ( .2 1 5 )  { .2 1 8 )  ( . 230) 
Number of other sites .083 .066 .06 1 .059 
( .043 ) ( .035 ) ( .030) ( .030)  
Constant 1 . 286 1 . 573 2.386 2 .074 
( . 649) ( .259)  ( .590)  ( . 293 ) 
X� for PRPs and PRPs squared 4.60 
p-value ( . 1 0 )  
Log l ikel i hood - 9 1 .5 - 85 .7  - 82 .7  - 8()7 
NoTE.-7oS observations. Standard errors i n  parentheses are adj usted for c lustering at the site kve ! .  
might occur with a general ly  high degree of corre lat ion between the out­
comes at trial for the PRPs. Based on the point estimate of . 857 , a multi­
PRP s i te is 4 percentage points more l ikely to settle than a comparable sin­
g le  PRP s i te.  At  the very least the equation presents no evidence to support 
a c la im that Superfund' s j oint and several liabi l i ty on balance d iscourages 
settlement. 
The total cost of c leanup at the site and the average cost per PRP also 
do not enter with statistical ly s igni fi cant coefficients.  The coefficients on 
these cost variables have opposi te signs, an effect that is d ifficult to i nter­
pret .  However, their standard errors are so large that one should not attri­
bute much i mportance to th i s  pattern . 
The variables represent ing defendants ' characterist ics have mixed results . 
Firms do not appear to settle s ig n i ficantly more often than other types of 
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defendants. Their litigation costs may not be significantly different on aver­
age from those of other types of defendants . However, increasing the num­
ber of sites at which this defendant is a PRP increases settlement. This  coef­
ficient i s  statistical ly significant at the 1 0  percent level in  al l  the columns. 
Thus, this variable may have the effect of increasing the defendant' s aver­
sion to litigation or improving its forecast of trial outcomes. 
The second column in Table 2 replaces the multi-PRP dummy with a 
continuous variable for the number of PRPs. The coefficient on this variable 
is positive and statistically  significant at the 5 percent level in  this equation. 
The elasticity of settlement with respect to the number of PRPs at the sam­
ple means is  . 0 1 ;  although this value appears smal l ,  it  should be  considered 
in the context of the high overall  settlement rate in our data. The positive 
coefficient on this variable tends to confirm proposition 2,  which holds that 
N should increase the settlement range, all else held constant. In addition, 
the result suggests that the data do not conform to proposition 6 (the case 
of independent outcomes) ,  in which n grows with N so that increases in  N 
reduce settlement incentives.  The results are consistent with proposition 5 
( the case of perfect conelation ), in which n = 1 and increases in  N increase 
settlement. Thus, as before, the results provide no evidence that joint and 
several l iabi lity reduces settlement and are at least consistent with the hy­
pothesis that it  encourages settlement. 
To explore further whether proposition S or proposition 6 fits the data 
better, we add an N2 term to the equation in column 3. This quadratic model 
does not fit the data very wel l .  Neither the coefficient on the l inear N term 
nor that on the squared term is individual ly statistically  significant, and their 
j oint statistical significance is only borderline with a p-value of exactly I 0 
percent. The point estimates suggest that N has a settlement-detening effect 
for smal ! N but a promoting effect for larger N. The quadratic function 
reaches a minimum at approximately N = 8 and passes back through zero 
at about N = 1 7  . 5 ,  approximately the sample mean . An explanation of this  
p attern is that the conditions for proposition 6 dominate for low N, that is ,  
n grows with N. For higher N. however, n does not grow with N, so  propo­
sition 5 more accurately describes the data . However, the size of the stan­
dard errors makes characterization of the functional form and thus of these 
relationships speculative. 
The fourth column in Table 2 adds measures of the similarity of the de­
fendants to examine the influence of conelation in trial outcomes on settl e­
ment. Proposition 3 suggests that variables that correspond to lower n 
should relax the conditions for settlement and thus raise settlement rates .  
Two such measures are included. The first measure, the presence of off-site 
PRPs, has a posit ive coefficient, which is counter to expectations, but the 
estimate is not s tati stically different from zero. 
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The second measure of correlation in column 4 of Table 2 is the timing 
of contamination . For reasons expl ained above, sites with contamination 
after 1 980 may have lower conelation in outcomes. The estimated coeffi­
cient is statistically significant and negative, consistent with this hypothesis .  
Thus, the estimates provide some support for the model ' s  prediction about 
the influence of correlation on settlement incentives. 
A concern with thi s  analysis is that the observations are selected on the 
basis  of whether an outcome i s  observed by March 1 997 .30 The l arge num­
ber of defendants whose cases are still in progress suggests that the results 
might be different  when al l cases have finished than they appear at this in­
terim state. However, it i s  possible that some cases indicated as ' ' i n  prog­
ress ' '  are in fact cases that the government has ceased to pursue but has not 
formally dropped. To i llustrate, defendant completion rates are l i ttle h igher 
for cases filed prior to 1 985 (76 percent) than for those fi led later (75 per­
cent) .  Thus, many " in  progress" cases may actually be cases that are not 
expected ever to reach either settlement or l i tigation. 
B. Time to Settlement 
A second set of equations explores the determinants of the speed with 
which settlement occurs .  Although a less direct test of the model than the 
first set of equations, this second set of equations has the advantage of 
richer variation in  its dependent variable  than the binary outcomes above. 
Our theoretical model assumes s imultaneous onetime offers, abstracting 
from all questions of t iming.  Thus. we do not have a formal model of time 
to settlement. 3 1  However, i t  seems plausible that parties will  find acceptable 
settlements sooner vvhen settlement incentives are stronger. Thus,  factors 
that typically reduce the litigation costs necessary for settlement or i ncrease 
the allowable degree of optim i sm shoul d  also encourage speedier settle­
ments . 
To study empirical ly the determinants of ti me to settlement, we analyze 
1 1 1  We attempted to address thi� prob lem by est imating a bivariate probit select ion model. 
The model has two equations: one equation determines  whether a case has an outcome yet 
and, condit ional on i t  having an outcome. a second equation indicates whether th i s  outcome 
is  settlement or l i t igation. To identify the second equation, we inc luded variables  i ndicating 
the time of fi li ng of  the case in  the first equat ion only.  This approach fol lows E i senberg & 
Farber, supra note 20. We were unable to obtain convergence for this model .  The d i ffic u l ty 
may stem from the small n umber of l i t igated observat ions .  
-' 1  For a theoretical model  of t ime to sett lement i n  a s ing le-defendant context. see Kathryn 
E. S pier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation. 5 9  Rev. Econ. Stud.  93 ( 1 992) .  For previous 
empirical work on t ime to settlement, sec Ei senberg & Farber, supra note 20; Gary M. Four­
nier & Thomas W. Zuehlke.  The Timing of Out-of-Court Sett lements. 27 RAND J. Econ. 3 l  0 
( 1 996); Danie l  Kessler. Insti tutional Causes of Delay i n  the Sett lement of Legal D i sp utes. 1 2  
J .  L.  Econ. & Org . 432 ( 1 996 ) 
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the time between when a case is filed and when settlement occurs . B ecause 
the filing date is  potentially endogenous ,  we previously estimated equations  
i n  which the duration began with the proposal of the s ite to  the  NPL.  The 
qualitative results were very similar across definitions, suggesting that en­
dogeneity in fil ing time shoul d  not be a maj or concern. As a result, we use 
the more natural definition of the beginning of a case. 
The sample for these equations includes all defendants who h ave settled 
by March 1 997. It also includes data for defendants whose cases were sti l l  
i n  progress at that time. Although a few o f  these cases in  progress may l iti­
gate rather than settle, their numbers are very small. Thus, incorrectly in­
cluding them as cases not yet settled should not significantly affect the re­
sults. 
To estimate the effects of the variable on time until settlement, we use 
a hazard-rate approach. This approach provides appropriate treatment for 
observations for which settlement time is unknown because the case has 
not yet settled. We estimate a proportional hazard model of the time until  
settlement. The fundamental component of the model is  the hazard rate , h, 
which i s  the probabi l i ty of settlement at time t for an observation condi­
t ional on not having settled before t . The model assumes that the covariates ,  
X, affect the hazard proportionately and enter the equation exponentially, as 
is conventional . Thus the functional form for the equation is assumed to be 
h (X, �'  t) = exp (X�)hn (t), (1 3) 
where ho (t) is  the baseline hazard rate and the estimated coefficients are � -
The Cox partial l ikelihood model uses the order in  which observations 
settle to estimate �.32 Thi s  approach avoids the need for arbitrary assump­
tions about the functional form of the basel ine hazard, h" (t) . The observa­
t ions are ranked i n  order of settlement times, with i representing their posi­
tion in thi s  ordering.  The conditional probabi l ity that observation  i settles 
at t ime t; i s  
h (X; ,  �, t,) 
IT;j h (Xi ,  �' t) 
Assuming the proportional hazard function above, the partial l ikel ihood for 
the sample is 
T, 
L ( 1 4) 
'2 For bGckground. see Nicholas Ivl .  Kiefer. Economic Duration Data and Hazard Func­
tions, 26 J. Econ. Literature 6.:\.6 ( 1 988) .  
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TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS Of TIME TO S ETTLEMENT: Cox PROPORTIONAL HAZARD ESTIMATES 
HAZARD RATE FOR SETTLEMENT 
( I )  ( 2) (3 )  (4) 
S ite characteristics: 
Multiple PRPs (dumm y )  . 1 75 
( .34 1 )  
Number of PRPs .0 1 0  .0 1 0  .02 1 
( .007) ( .023) ( .007) 
Number of PRPs squared .034 
(divided by J 0,000) (2 .88)  
Off-site contributors - .5 63 
( .232)  
Contaminat ion after 1 980 .254 
( .233) 
Cleanup cost - .0 1 7  - .020 - .020 - .023 
( .009) (.0 J 0) ( .0 l 0) ( .009) 
Cost per PRP .04 1 .046 .046 .043 
( 0 1 6) ( .0 I I ) ( .0 1 1 ) ( .0  I I ) 
Defendant cha�·acteristics: 
Firm .296 .275 .275 . 2 1 1 
( . 1 74) ( . 1 77)  ( . J 78)  ( . 1 66 )  
Number of other s i tes . 1 79 . 1 02 . 1 02 .356 
(divided by 1 00) ( .275)  ( .250) ( . 247) ( .256)  
x '  for PRPs and PRPs squared 3.49 
p-value ( . 1 7 )  
Log l i kel ihood - 4.755 -4,750 -4,750 -4.725 
NOTE.- 1 .052 observations: 766 uncensored. Standard en·ors i n  parentheses are adjusted for c lustering 
at the site level .  A higher coefficient indicates a h igher hazard rate and a shorter expected time until settle-
ment. 
where T" is the number of uncensored observations and T is the total num­
ber of observations.  Censored observations,  which had not settled by March 
1 997, contribute only to the denominator. Any observation that has not 
settled after t; (whether censored or uncensored) appears in the summation 
of the denominator for the ith observation ( the group "at r isk" for settle­
ment) . 
Table 3 contains estimates of coefficients � from maximization of  the log 
l ikelihood. A positive coefficient indicates a higher hazard rate for settle­
ment at any give time and thus a shorter t ime until settlement. As a result,  
variables with positive coefficients can be interpreted as settlement promot­
ing, as in the previous equations. Again ,  we adjusted the standard enors for 
c lustering at the site level. 
The columns in Table 3 use the same covariates as the columns in  Table 
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2. The first  column compares s ites w ith multiple PRPs with sole PRP sites.  
As  before, the estimated coefficient is positive but not statistically s ignifi­
cant. There i s  at  least no evidence to support the view that the presence of 
multiple PRPs delays settlement. 
The cost variables have the same signs as in Table 2:  the total cost delays 
settlement, whereas the cost per PRP encourages settlement .  Unl ike the es­
timates in  Table 2,  however, the cost coefficients in Table 3 are statistically 
s ignificant. The negative coefficient on cleanup cost i s  expected because 
higher costs have the same effect as lower lit igation costs in the model . A 
positive coefficient on costs per PRP is  puzzling, however, when the effect 
of total costs i s  negative. 
The defendant characteristics also have coefficients of the same sign i n  
Table 3 a s  in  Table 2.  The coefficient on the dummy variable for defendants 
that are firms is positive and statisti cally significant at the 1 0  percent level 
i n  the first  column. However, when additional explanatory variables are 
added in the next columns, th i s  coefficient is no longer statistically signifi­
cant. The number of other s i tes at which the defendant is  l isted as a PRP 
al so has a positive sign, as before, but i s  not statistically s ign ificant in any 
of  the equations .  
The second column of Table 3 i ncludes a continuous variable for the 
number of PRPs, as a measure of N. The coefficient on thi s  v ariable is posi­
tive in column 2 but not statistical l y  significant. Again,  th i s  estimate is in­
consistent with proposition 6,  in  which N discourages settlement .  When we 
introduce controls  for n .  the positive coefficient on N becomes statistically 
s ignificant. This result confirms proposition 2,  which posits that the settle­
ment range increases in N when we hold other attributes of the case con­
stant.  
Column 3 extends the model to include a squared term in  N. The coeffi­
cient on this  variable i s  estimated very impreci sely. Nonetheless,  the point 
estimates suggest that increasing N always encourages settlement. Thus, the 
point estimates are consistent with proposition 5 rather than proposition 6 .  
However, the coefficients on the N and N �  variables are neither individually 
nor jointly statistically s ignificant, so it is not possible to draw any conclu­
sion about this rel ationship. 
In the fourth column, the presence of off-site contributors at the s i te ap­
pears to decrease the hazard rate for settlement and thus  to i ncrease ex­
pectecl time until  settlement. This  coefficient is statistically s ignificant at the 
5 percent level .  This estimate supports the expectation from the theoretical 
model that lower values of n tend to discourage settlement. The coeffic ient 
on contamination after 1 980 is posit ive, which is inconsi stent w i th the 
model, but is not stati stically significant.  
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V. CoNCLUSION 
Our results provide support for the leading theoretical model of parties' 
responses to joint and several l iabi lity. We fi nd that having groups of PRPs 
with possibly divergent defense strategies discourages and delays settle­
ment. Because this divergence i s  l ikely to be associated with l ower conela­
tion among defendants in outcome at tria l ,  this negative relationship sup­
ports our theoretical predictions. For example, in an alternative model in  
which defendants cooperate with one another in  reaching settlement, we  
woul d  no t  expect to  see such a relationship. Furthermore, i f  cooperation be­
comes more difficult  to sustain with larger numbers of defendants , the co­
operative model would predict a negative relationship between the number 
of PRPs and settlement, but we find evidence of a positive relationship in­
stead. 
In addition, our results suggest that joint  and several l iabil i ty under 
CERCLA is  more l ikely on balance to promote settlement than inhibit it .  
Previous theoretical research has concluded that the effect of j oint  and 
several l iab i l ity on settlement is ambiguous a priori . In our data, the effect 
of the number of PRPs on settlement is more consistent w ith the results 
predicted for the case of perfect correlation in tria l  outcomes among de­
fendants (in which the l i abil i ty regime promotes settlement) than with 
those predicted for the case of i ndependent outcomes (in which the l iability 
regime inhibits settlement). Cunent proposals would restrict joi nt and 
several l iabi l ity in favor of nonjoint  l iabil ity rules. Our results suggest 
that these changes will not increase the settlement rate and may in fact 
decrease i t .  
An increase in  l iti gation and delay of settlements could raise the 
overal l  transaction costs per Superfund site. The level of these costs 
is already a serious concern. Recent studies by RAND indicate that trans­
action costs may account for 23 to 3 1 percent of total private Super­
fund expenditures .33 In addition, legal costs cunently account for about l 0 
percent of the public spending on Superfund.'� If j oint and several l iab i l ity 
does encourage sett lement, it could lower the government' s costs per 
site. Its effects on private costs are ambiguous, however, g iven that vve 
have not considered suits for contribution against nonsett l i ng PRPs . None­
theless, the results presented here suggest that reduc ing legal costs per s i te 
33 See Lloyd S .  Dixon, The Transaction Costs Generated by Superfund ' s  L iabi l i ty  Ap­
proach, in Revcsz & S tewart eels . ,  supm note 6. at 1 7 l ,  1 80.  
3 4  See U . S .  Environmental Protection Agency, Progress toward Implement ing Superfund: 
Fiscal Year 1 994. at 1 26 ( l 994) .  
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does not provide a good rationale for changing Superfund' s l iab il i ty 
regime.35 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an offer from the p laintiff to settle w ith each 
defendant for min[s"/ N, l /(N - 1 )] minus some infinitesimal amount. If S > 0, 
then the plaintiff would prefer settlement with all defendants on such terms over 
litigation against all defendants. Each defendant would prefer to settle on these 
terms rather than l i tigate alone. Therefore. settlement among all parties is a Nash 
equi l ibrium among the defendants. 
Consider an offer from the p laintiff to settle with each defendant for the amount 
just barely acceptable for the p l aintiff: s/N. If  S < 0, then the defendants wi l l  not 
accept this offer. The plaintiff might al so consider making an offer to settle with 
some defendants on terms better than those offered to other defendants . For such a 
settlement to be worth\vhi l e  for the p laintiff, offers below s,,l N must be  offset by 
other offers sufficiently above s1,/ N such that the plaintiff gets at l east s1, in tota l .  
The defendant paying the most  under such a settlement, however, would never 
accept such an offer, because it would do better by l i tigating alone against the p lain­
tiff. That defendant would  have even stronger incentives to l it igate alone than it 
would under a symmetric offer to settle for s, .  Although it would have a greater 
expected l i ability if i t  litigates alone. because the setoff resulting from the settle­
ment with the other N - 1 defendants would be smaller than under the symmetric 
offer. the increase in that defendant ' s  expected l i abi l ity at trial would not be as great 
as the increase in the plaintiff ' s  demand from that defendant in a settlement. The 
increase in the p laintiff ' s  demand from that defendant must be at l east as large as 
the decrease in  the p laintiff ' s  demands from the other N - 1 defendants. Further­
more, the decreased settlement from the other N - l defendants wi l l  i mpose a cost 
on the Nth defendant in terms of a reduced setoff only if that defendant loses at 
trial ,  which would  occur only with probabi l ity /h Therefore, that defendant would 
strictly prefer to l i tigate alone rather than accept the plaintiff ' s  settlement offer. 
Q E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We can derive a l l  of our comparative statics results by 
totally differentiating equation (9) and taking the relevant partial derivatives of S, 
but most of these results shoul d  be obvious from an inspection of equation (9) . The 
only partial derivative that appears to be ambiguous is S' (p" ) ,  which i s  strictly posi­
tive if and only if 
1 5  Of course,  there may be other reasons to maintain o!· change the l iability regime.  For 
example, jo in t  and several l i ab i l i ty may affect incentives for precaution against  env ironmen­
tal contaminat ion.  See Kahan, supra note 1 4: Kornhauser & Revesz. supra note 6; A .  M itch­
�: 1 1  Polinsky & Daniel L .  Rubinfeld. The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials,  8 Tnt '  I 
Rev . L. & Econ. 1 09 ( 1 988) ;  Kathryn E. S pier, A Note on Joint and S everal Liabi l i ty :  I nsol­
vency, Sett lement. and Incentives. 23 J .  Legal Stud. 559 ( 1  994): Tom H. Tie tenberg, Indivis i ­
b le  Toxic  Torts: The Economics of Joint  and S e veral Liabi l i ty,  65 Land Econ . 305 ( 1 989). 
Joint 2nd several liabil i ty may also raise i ssues of fairness.  See David B. S pence, Imposing 
ind i \' i dual  Liab i l i ty  as a Legis la t ive Policy Choi c e :  Holmesian "In tu i t ions" and S uperfund 
Reform. 93 Nw.  U. L .  Rev . 389 ( 1 999)  
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1 c" < --. 
N - 1 
Assumption ( l l ), however, ensures that inequal i ty (A l )  must hold. Q.E.D .  
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(A I )  
Proof of Proposition 3. W e  can derive all o f  these comparative statics results 
by sett ing equation (9) equal to zero and totally differentiating, then solving for the 
relevant partial derivati ves of p;j,  p;;, c;)' , and c;J'. Most of these resu l ts should be 
obvious, however, once we set equation (9) equal to zero, solve for pfl', c:i', and 
c} , in  tum, and inspect the resulting expressions.  The only partial  derivatives that 
appear to be ambiguous pertain to ptf, but these all become u nambiguous if inequal­
ity (A l )  holds, and assumption (1 1 )  ensures that inequal i ty (A l )  must hold. Q.E.D .  
Proof of Proposition 5. 
a) It sho�ld be obvious from an i nspection of equation (9) that if  c11 = c" = 0, 
p" = pI' = p, n = 1 ,  and N > L then S > 0. We can also show that the plaintiff 
w i l l  prefer to settle with all defendants rather than l it igate against  any defendant. 
S uppose the plaintiff settles with k defendants for an amount s* per defendant and 
l itigates against the other N - k, where 1 ::::; k ::::; N. The plaintiff ' s  payoff wi l l  then 
be 
ks * + p [ l  - ks ''' l .  (A2) 
I f  k > 0, so that the plaintiff settles with at least one defendant, suppose also that 
the p la intiff chooses the s* that is l arge enough that each settl ing defendant is j ust 
barely  wil l ing to accept the sett lement offer rather than to join the N - k defendants 
in l i ti gating against the p la intiff. That i s ,  
.,. 1 - (k - 1 )s * 
s ··· = p . 
N + l - k 
(A3) 
The pl aintiff cannot settle with k defendants and enjoy a better payoff by offering 
unequal terms to the k defendants, because the defendant paying the h ighest amount 
would refuse the offer and l i tigate instead, by reasoning s imi lar to that used in the 
proof of proposition I .  
If we solve equation (A3)  for s ''' and substitute in  express ion ( A2), we fi nd that 
the pl aintiff ' s  payoff from settl ing with k defendants is 
( 1  - p)kp p + -----��--
pN + ( l - p) (N + - k )' 
which is strict ly i ncreasing i n k .  Therefore, k = N maximizes the p laint iff ' s  payoff. 
The plaintiff w i l l  choose to settle with al l defendants, a!1d it w i l l  be a Nash equilib­
r ium for al l  parties to settle .  Q.E.D.  
b)  If we set 1 1  = I ,  c d  = c1, = 0,  and p 11 = p" = p ,  then these results  should be 
obvious from an inspection of equation ( 9 ) .  Q.E .D .  
c)  We can se t  equation ( 9 )  equal to  zero , and if  we let cl' = cd = 0 and solve 
for pd, then we find 
p;/ 
+ (N - I ) ( 1  - p1,) ', 
(A4) 
If we set 1 1  = 1 , then our results should be obvious from an inspect ion of equation 
(A4) . Q.E .D .  
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d) We can set equation (9) equal to zero, and if  we let c" = c" = 0 and solve 
for p1, then we find 
( 1 - p ) 'I' 
p *  = 1 - d " 1 + pAN - 1 )  . (A5) 
If we set n = 1 ,  then our resul ts should be obvious from an inspection of equation 
(A5 ) .  Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 6. 
a) Using equation (9) ,  we can show that if c11 = c, = 0, Pd = p" = p, and n = 
N, then S < 0 i f  and only i f  
[(N - l )p + 1 ) ( 1  - p)'H < I .  (A6) 
Note that if  N = 1, then both sides of inequality (A6) equal one.  Therefore, to prove 
inequality (A6) holds for N > 1 ,  it w i l l  suffice to show that the l eft-hand side of 
i nequali ty (A6) decreases in  N. Taking the derivative of the left-hand side of in­
equal i ty (A6) with respect to N yie lds an expression that i s  negative if  and only if  
p < - [ (N - 1 )p + 1 ] l n ( l - p) .  (A7)  
Given that the right-hand s ide of inequali ty (A 7) i s  strictl y i ncreasing in  N, i t  w i l l  
b e  sufficient t o  show that i nequality (A 7)  holds for N = I .  That i s ,  i t  w i l l  suffice 
to show that 
p < - l n ( l  - p). (A8) 
To show that i nequality (A8) holds as long as 0 < p < I ,  first note that if  p = 0, 
then both sides of inequality (A8) equal zero. Therefore, it  w i l l  suffice to show that 
- In( ! - p) increases in p at a faster rate than p. That i s ,  taking the derivative of  
each s ide of inequality (A8)  wi th  respect to p ,  i t  is sufficient  to show that 
I 
1 < ---, 
! - p 
which is obviously true as l ong as 0 < p < 1 .  Q.E.D .  
b )  It  should b e  obvious from a n  inspection of equation ( 9 )  that if  c "  = c,, = 0, 
p" = p, = p, and n = N, then S(  1 )  = 0 and S(N ) approaches zero as N goes to 
infinity. These results ,  together with result  (a), imply that S(N) must first fal l  and 
then rise as N increases from one to infin i ty .  To show that S(N) has a unique local  
minimum, set  c" = c, = 0, p" = p" = p, and 1 l  = N in equation (9) ,  and then take 
the derivative of S with respect to N. We can show that S' (N) = 0 if and only i f  
fJ = - [ J  + (N - l )pf ( l  - p)N- I ln ( l  - p) .  (A9) 
Using i nequali ty (A8) ,  we can show that at  N = 1 ,  the right-hand s ide of equation 
(A9) i s  greater than the l eft-hand s ide .  Therefore, to  show that equation (A9) holds 
at a unique N, because the right-hand s ide of equation (A9) i s  a continuous function 
of N, i t  wil l  be sufficient to show that i f  the right-hand s ide of  equation (A9) is 
strictly decreasing at N = ):, then i t  remains so for a l l  N > x .  Taking the derivative 
of the right-hand side of equation (A9) with respect to N yields an expression that 
i s  negative if  and only if 
2p < - [ 1  + ( N - l )p] ln ( l  - p).  (A l O) 
I 
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Given that the right-hand side of inequality (A 1 0) is  strictly increasing i n  N, i f  in­
equality (A l O) holds for N = x ,  then i t  holds for any N > x .  Therefore, S' (N) = 0 
must occur at a unique N. Q.E.D .  
c)  Assume cr = c "  = 0,  but  suppose P<� and pP can differ. If  we se t  n = N, then 
equation (A4) impl ies that 
'" 1 - C 1  - p,Y P :r = ---- - -'--- --
N - (N - 1 ) [ 1 - ( 1  - p,,)N] 
(A l l )  
I t  should be obvious from an inspection of equation ( A  1 1 ) that i f  N = 1 ,  then p ;; 
= pP, and that p;)' (N)  approaches one as N goes to infinity.  To complete the proof, 
we must show that pj' (N )  increases monotonical ly in N. 
To show that p;J " (N) > 0, take the derivative of equation ( A l l )  with respect to 
N. The result  is an expression that is positive if and only if  
( A l 2) 
Given inequality (A8) ,  we know that inequal i ty (A l 2) holds for N = I .  Therefore, 
to show pf; ' (N) > 0 for a l l  N 2:: I ,  it is sufficient to show that the left-hand side 
of i nequali ty ( A l 2) i ncreases i n N. Taking the derivative of the left-hand side of 
inequal i ty (A 1 2) with respect to N yields 
- l n ( l  - PrH l  - ( 1 - p1,) 'v ] , 
which is positive. Q.E.D.  
d )  Assume cP = c" = 0, but suppose P<� and p, can differ. If we set n = N, then 
equation (AS) implies that 
( 1 - f'J )'� p ''' = 1 - " !' I + pAN - I )  . (A 1 3 )  
I t  should b e  obvious from a n  inspection of equation (A 1 3 )  that if  N = 1 ,  then 
p;;' = p,. To complete the proof, we must show that p;;' (N) decreases in  N and 
approaches zero as N goes to infinity .  Take the derivative of  equation ( A l 3 )  with 
respect to N. The result is  an expression that is negati ve if  and only if 
1 - p" + Npd I 1 - P d  P<� < - n 
N l - p" + Npd 
(A l 4) 
Note that i f  pd = 0, then both s ides of inequal i ty (A 1 4) equal zero. Therefore, to 
show that i nequality (A l 4) holds for 0 < P <� < 1 ,  it is sufficient to show that the 
right-hand side of i nequal ity ( A l 4 )  increases in  p" at a faster rate than the left-hand 
side . Taking the derivative of the right-hand side of inequality (A l4) with respect 
to p" yields an expression that i s  greater than one if and only if 
Np" + (N - l ) ln 
1 - P<� + Np" > 0, 
l - P" 1 - p "  (A 1 5) 
which i s  obviously true for any N ;::::: I .  Therefore , p;;' dec lines monotonically in N. 
To show that p;/ approaches zero as N goes to infinity, express equation (A l 3) 
as fol lows: 
(A 1 6) 
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I t  wi l l  be sufficient to show that for any p;' between zero and Pd· there exists an N 
that solves equation (A l 6), setting aside the integer constraint  on N. For p; = pd, 
N = 1 solves equation (A l 6) .  For any smaller positive p;, there ex is ts an N suffi­
ciently l arge to solve equation (A l 6) .  The l eft-hand side of equation (A l 6) i s  the 
product of two functions of N. The first function decreases in N; the second in­
creases in N. Each uni t  increase i n  N causes the first function to fall by the same 
percentage but causes the second to increase by an ever decreasing percentage. 
Thus, for any p�' between zero and pd, a sufficiently l arge N w i l l  cause the l eft­
hand side of equation (A l 6)  to fal l ,  and we can always make the l eft-hand side as 
smal l  as necessary to solve equation (A 1 6) by choosing a suffic ient ly large N. 
Therefore, we can make p; arbitrari l y  close to zero by choosing a sufficiently 
large N. Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 7. 
a) If n = N, p" = p" = p, c" = 0, but cd > 0, then we know from equation (9)  
that 
cJ � [1 - ( 1  - p )"] [p + I � p ] - p .  (A l 7 )  
I t  should b e  obvious from an inspection o f  equation (A 1 7) that if  N = 1 ,  then 
d = 0, and that d approaches zero as N goes to infi ni ty .  Using equation (A l 7) , 
we can show that d > 0 i f  and only if inequality (A6) holds. Given that we have 
already shown that inequal i ty (A6) holds for any N > I ,  it fol lows that cj' > 0 for 
any N > 1 .  
To show that dCN) has a unique local maximum, take the derivative of equation 
(A l 7) with respect to N. We can show that c:i" (N) = 0 if  and on ly  if 
( l - pt - N ln ( J - p) ( l - p)N- 1 [Np + 1 - p] = l .  ( A l 8) 
Given inequality (A8),  we can show that at N = 1 ,  the left-hand s ide of equation 
( A l 8) i s  greater than the right-hand side. Therefore, to show that equation (A l 8) 
holds at a unique N, because the left-hand side of equation ( A l 8) i s  a continuous 
function of N. i t  wil l  be s ufficient to show that if the left-hand s ide of equation 
( A  1 8) is strict ly decreasing at N = x .  then it remains so for al l  N > x .  Taking the 
derivative of the left-hand s ide of equation (A 1 8) with respect to N yields an ex­
pression that i s  negative if  and only if inequality (A 1 0) holds .  We have already 
shown that if inequal ity (A 1 0) holds for N = .r, then it holds for any N > x. There­
fore , c}' (N) = 0 must occur at a unique N. Q.E.D.  
b )  It should be obvious  from an inspection of equation (9)  that  the expression 
for S if c1, = 0 is the same as the expression for - c1, if  S = 0. Therefore, resul t  (b) 
fol lows directly from the proofs of proposi t ion 6(a) and 6(b) .  Q.E .D .  
